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THE FAILURE OF THE DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE STANDARD: HOW MARBURY V

WARDEN GIVES PRISON OFFICIALS MORE
JUSTIFICATION TO DEVALUE LIFE
BY bex kolins*
INTRODUCTION

"We do not sentence people to be stabbed and beaten. But we might as
well, if the Majority Opinion is correct." 396 The quotation that opens this note
is part of Justice Robin Stacie Rosenbaum's dissent in Marbury v. Warden
that indicates the deadly consequences of the court's Majority Opinion. The
Majority Opinion reinforces the power dynamics that exist between people
in prison and prison officials, which exacerbate the second-class status of
those incarcerated. Even though protection from cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment is afforded to prisoners 397 in the
United States, officials fail to adequately ensure that safety. Within the
United States, Alabama's prisons-where Marbury v. Warden was
decided-are notorious for being overcrowded, under resourced, and
understaffed. 398 The result is a significantly higher rate of prisoner-onprisoner violence, violence from prison officials, incidents of sexual assaults,
and overall poorer and less adequate prison conditions for those
incarcerated.399
Several months before the opinion in Marbury, the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued an extensive report describing the extent
to which Alabama prisons were inadequate and violated prisoners' Eighth
Amendment rights."' In the court's decision in Marbury, the court found
that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of the defendants'
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. 0 ' Despite

hex kolins is a J.D. candidate at North Carolina Central University School of Law, class of 2021.
The author received a B.A. from Skidmore College in 2012. The author dedicates this case note to
all the people locked away in cages-those the State wants us to forget.
396. Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2019) (Rosenbaum, R., dissenting).
397. This note will use the term "prisoner" to refer to people incarcerated in prison, because it
aligns with the history of the Prisoner Rights Movement, of which the author of this paper aligns
themselves. When Prisoner Rights organization Black and Pink conducted a survey asking people
in prison what term they would prefer to be used to identify themselves, "most respondents wrote
in their name or simply, 'my name.' Given that there was no general agreement on terminology
from respondents, [Black and Pink] use the word "prisoner" as an identifying term for all
incarcerated individuals." See Coming out of Concrete Closets: A Report on Black and Pink's
National LGBTQ Survey, Black and Pink, 13 (Oct. 21, 2015).
398. See Katie Benner & Shaila Dewan, Alabama's Gruesome Prisons:ReportFinds Rape and
Murder at All Hours, NEW YORK TIMES, (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/03/us/alabama-prisons-doj-investigation.html; Andrew J. Yawn, 350 Weapons Were
Seized in an Alabama Prison. A Week Later Stabbings Continued, USA TODAY, (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/04/30/week-after-weapons-seized-holman-3inmates-stabbed/3627973002/.
399. Id.
400. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Investigation ofAlabama's State Prisonsfor Men, 1-2 (Apr. 2,
2019), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/1149971/download.
401. Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1238.
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Mitchell Marbury's many attempts to report the threat he faced, the prison
402
officials failed to act, and he was ultimately stabbed repeatedly. This note
will explore how the deliberate indifference elements were satisfied
sufficiently to survive a motion for summary judgment both from the record
Marbury provided and from the independent DOJ report issued months prior.
Additionally, this note will discuss the possible long-reaching ramifications
this case may have on other prison condition cases, both in Alabama and

beyond.
THE CASE

On April 23, 2016, Mitchell Marbury was stabbed and hit multiple
times in the face while incarcerated at Alabama's St. Clair Correctional
Facility (St. Clair).4 03 This incident occurred after Marbury made numerous
4 04
requests to be transferred to a different dormitory or to protective custody.
Marbury's repeated requests were made between February and April of
2016.411 On February 12, 2016, Marbury sent a written request to Warden
Dewayne Estes noting that he had witnessed more than fifteen stabbings, and
40 6
he requested to be assigned to a more "sociable" living area for his safety.
Warden Estes ignored the written request sent on February 12*i and two
others sent on April 5* and April 1 9 *407
408
Marbury also made in-person requests to Officer Beverly Warren.
Marbury later asserted in a signed affidavit that Officer Warren taunted him
4 09
In
and expressed that she would ensure his requests were denied.
Marbury's last request to Estes and Warren asking to be placed in isolation,
Marbury specifically noted that a friend told him to watch his back because
10
someone planned to harm him. 4 Prison staff noted that they were unable to
identify the person who attacked Marbury on April 23, 2016-a factor
4
important in the Majority's Opinion.
Marbury filed a pro se § 1983 complaint alleging that Warden Estes and
Officer Warren failed to protect him from unsafe conditions, were
deliberately indifferent to those conditions, and retaliated against him for
4 12
The magistrate judge
exercising his constitutionally protected rights.
41 3
Marbury objected
judgment.
summary
for
motion
granted the defendants'

402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Id. at 1232.
Id.
Id. at 1231.
Id.
Id.

407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1232.
411. Id.

412. Id.
413. Id.
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/6
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only on the deliberate indifference issue, which was overruled by the district
court that adopted the report and recommendation from the magistrate. 1 4
The issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether a jury could find that
Marbury's reported claim that an unnamed prisoner intended to harm him
was sufficient to make the defendants aware of a substantial risk of serious
harm, as required by the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
standard.415 Ultimately, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to grant
summary judgment, emphasizing that the record presented by Marbury failed
to rise to the necessary level to show deliberate indifference to a substantial
risk of serious harm. 416 The court further provided that while Officer Warren
may have been put on notice of some risk that Marbury faced, she was not
aware of the type of substantial risk of serious harm necessary to establish a
deliberate indifference case. 417 The court's determination that there was a
lack of a substantial risk or threat was compounded by Marbury's failure to
provide the identity of the person threatening him; while the court
emphasized that a general threat of violence is typically insufficient to satisfy
the deliberate indifference qualifiers, the prisoner is required to provide
sufficient facts to "bolster an otherwise insufficient unspecific threat of
harm." 418 The court found that because Marbury failed to show that "serious
[prisoner-on-prisoner] violence was the norm or something close to it,"4 " he
failed to show more than a generalized awareness of risk.
Justice Robin Stacie Rosenbaum's dissent lists three errors the Majority
Opinion makes in reaching its decision.42 0 The three reasons she provides are
that the Majority Opinion: (1) fails to view the facts in light most favorable
to the non-moving party, Marbury; (2) does not account for important facts
in its analysis; and (3) evaluates the evidentiary components of Marbury's
claim separately rather than holistically."' She concludes that while
Marbury's allegations may not convince a jury that the facts are what he
claims, they are to be taken in the light most favorable to him, and therefore
the court erred in granting summary judgment.2 2
BACKGROUND

Prisoners are protected against cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. In order for a prisoner to successfully argue that a prison
official violated the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must show that the

414. Id.
415. Id. at 1236.
416. Id at 1238.
417. Id.
418. Id at 1237.
419. Id. at 1234 (quoting Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1322
(11th Cir. 2005)).
420. Id at 1239.
421. Id.
422.
Id at and
1241.Scholarship Digital Archives, 2020
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43
official was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm.
As indicated through case law, deliberate indifference is a state of mind that
is more blameworthy than negligence, but less than acts of omissions or acts
with the intent to cause harm. 424 The deliberate indifference standard used
for prison condition cases differs from the standard required for claims of
excessive force by prison officials. In instances of excessive force, the
prisoner must establish that the official applied force maliciously or for the
purpose of causing harm. 2 1 In instances of prisoner-on-prisoner violence,
officials are not constitutionally liable for every injury a prisoner suffers at
the hands of another prisoner.426 Rather, in order for a prisoner to establish a
§ 1983 claim for deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show "(1) a
substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant's deliberate indifference
to that risk; and (3) causation." 2
The first element-whether there was a substantial risk of harmrequires the plaintiff to show "conditions that were extreme and posed an
42 8
The
unreasonable risk of serious injury to [their] future health or safety."
second element-whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that
risk-requires both subjectivity and objectivity. The official must
subjectively be aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists.4 2 ' Additionally, the official must
have objectively responded to that known risk in an unreasonable manner."
An unreasonable manner requires the official to knowingly or recklessly
43
decline to act, despite knowing of ways to reduce the harm. ' The last
element-causation-requires the failure of the official to have been
32
responsible for the harm or injury suffered by the prisoner.
The DOJ released a memorandum regarding an investigation of
Alabama prisons and the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) on
33
The investigation
April 2, 2019, months before the opinion at hand.
concluded that there was reasonable cause to find that Alabama's prison
43 4
The
conditions violated prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights.
the
violates
routinely
Alabama
investigation specifically yielded that
constitutional rights of prisoners housed in Alabama's prisons "by failing to

423. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994); See Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307
(11th Cir. 2016).
424. Farmer, at 835.
425. Id. at 835-36; See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); See also Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
426. Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834).
427. Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Hale v. Tallapoosa
Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995))).
428. Id.
429. Id.; See Rodriguez v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007).
430. Id.; See Rodriguez, 508 F.3d. at 620.
431. Id.; See Rodriguez, 508 F.3d. at 620.
432. Id.
433. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 5, at 1-2.
434. Id.
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/6
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protect them from [prisoner-on-prisoner] violence ... and by failing to
provide safe conditions." 45
The report further provided that ADOC officials were aware of the
conditions within its prisons, and specifically that these conditions presented
an objectively substantial risk to those incarcerated. 436 According to the
report, this knowledge dates back to 1975,4"7 when a federal court enjoined
ADOC from accepting new prisoners until the prison population was reduced
to the capacity of the corresponding prison. 438 Then, again in 2011, the same
court found that ADOC facilities were still understaffed, overcrowded, and
therefore posed a threat to prisoners. 439 The DOJ's inquiry into ADOC
facilities demonstrates that ADOC was aware of the issues that existed at the
time of the DOJ's report.4 0 As it relates to the case at hand "several years
before [the DOJ] initiated [their] investigation, ADOC was . . . aware of
extensive problems at St. Clair. In 2014 alone, there were at least three
publicly reported prisoner on prisoner homicides."" 1 Prison officials at St.
Clair had access to this report, which explicitly provided them with
knowledge of the substantial risk of harm.
Additionally, with the assistance of the Equal Justice Initiative,"' a
group of prisoners filed a class action lawsuit against St. Clair alleging a high
rate of violence, including six homicides in 2014 alone. 43 In November
2017, the plaintiffs of the class action reached a settlement; yet, many of the
reforms ADOC committed to were not satisfied by 2018 when the parties
went back into mediation.' The report emphatically notes that "ADOC
management is acutely aware of the substantial risk of harm caused by its
critically dangerous understaffing."" The prison officials had copious
evidence, both from the DOJ report and the class action suit brought two
years prior, of the substantial risk of generalized harm that every prisoner at
St. Clair faced from understaffing and overcrowding..
ANALYSIS

The deliberate indifference standard to Eighth Amendment violations
theoretically provides an avenue to ensure the rights of prisoners. As
previously mentioned, this standard, while higher than negligence, does not
435. Id.
436. Id at 47-48.
437. Though arguably even earlier because of the use of convict-leasing and other methods of
incarceration where staff and officials were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm.
See Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51

U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163-64 (1984).
438. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 5, at 48.
439. Id at 47-48.
440. See Id. at 48.
441. Id. at 47.
442. The Equal Justice Initiative (EJ) is a law firm based out of Montgomery, Alabama. See
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, https://eji.org.
443. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 5, at 49.
444. Id.
Id. and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2020
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require the highest standard of establishing intent. The deliberate
indifference standard allows an opening for generalized risk of prisoner-onprisoner violence and requires more specific threats to safety. This
generalized risk is often created by substandard prison conditions and the
normalcy of violence. In Marbury, the court highlighted that the record failed
to provide sufficient evidence to establish a general risk of prisoner-onprisoner violence that rose to the necessary deliberate indifference standard
required by law. 44 6 Additionally, the court noted that despite Marbury's
many pleas to Warden Estes and Officer Warren, they objectively and
subjectively lacked knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to Marbury
7
because Marbury failed to provide the attacker's identity."
Justice Rosenbaum's dissent thoroughly discusses why the motion for
summary judgment should have been denied. She provides sufficient
evidence to establish that Warden Estes and Officer Warren violated
Marbury's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment." 8 If the Majority Opinion in Marbury is now the precedent to
establish a deliberate indifference claim, what is required of prisoners to
establish a violation of their Eighth Amendment right to protection against
cruel and unusual punishment? According to Justice Rosenbaum, if the
circumstances surrounding this case do not rise to the level of deliberate
9
indifference, "it is difficult to imagine what would."" As a result of the
court's holding on the defendants' deliberate indifference to both Marbury's
generalized violence and specific threat claim, prison officials may continue
to refuse to protect prisoners in the face of known threats and in violation of
their Eighth Amendment rights.
I.

DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE AS IT RELATES TO A GENERAL LACK OF
SAFETY.

The potential ramifications of this decision, some of which Justice
Rosenbaum's dissent discussed, are quite chilling. Throughout the Majority
Opinion, the court emphasized the problems with Marbury's claims of
generality.4 " Even if Marbury provided sufficient evidence of a risk, the
court argued, he did not make sufficient allegations regarding the specific
41
features of St. Clair that made it particularly violent. Marbury asserted in
his claim, which was in the record before the court, that because of the lack
of security staff, St. Clair was open to lawlessness, and prisoners frequently
assaulted each other with knives.4 52 These instances of lawlessness and a
normalcy of violence corroborates Marbury's assertion of the known danger
he and the rest of the prisoners at St. Clair faced. Yet, despite access to the
446. Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1234-35.
447. Id. at 1237-38.
448. Id. at 1240.
449. Id. at 1244.
450. Id. at 1234.
451. Id. at 1235.
452. Id. at 1241.
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/6
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DOJ Report, which Justice Rosenbaum mentioned in a note during her
dissent, 4 3 the court was still unmoved. If a report released by a governmentagency that explicitly notes the rampant violence and violations of prisoners'
Eighth Amendment rights is insufficient evidence of the violence at St. Clair,
then what is sufficient to ensure protection of other prisoners?
The Majority Opinion also chose to interpret Marbury's allegation of
witnessing over fifteen prisoner-on-prisoner stabbings as having transpired
over six years, as opposed to the six and a half months that he likely
intended.454 Justice Rosenbaum's dissent more thoroughly discussed the
court not following the summary judgment standard in making all reasonable
inferences in Marbury's favor. Again, the question arises, what would be a
more shocking number to the court? How many stabbings would Marbury
need to have witnessed in order to satisfy this suddenly high summary
judgment standard? Additionally, the Majority failed to give a sufficient
justification for its assumption that Marbury intended his statement that he
was at St. Clair for a "short time" to correlate with the time he was previously
housed at St. Clair, from 2002-2007, instead of the most recent six and a half
months before he filed the complaint. The evidence seems clear that Marbury
intended his statement to suggest the past six and a half months, an
exceedingly short time to have witnessed fifteen stabbings.
In looking at both Marbury's allegations and the DOJ Report, it is clear
that there was generalized violence commonplace at St. Clair. Marbury's
requests for protection certainly provided both defendants with knowledge
of a substantial risk of harm. Yet, the Eleventh Circuit's ruling evidences
that despite the DOJ naming constitutional violations rampant at St. Clair,
and fifteen stabbings having occurred in the past six and a half months, there
was still not enough of a substantial risk present to protect Marbury.

II. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE AS IT RELATES TO A SPECIFIC THREAT OF
DANGER.

The Majority Opinion also failed to find that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the specific threat Marbury warned them about in

April 2016.

While noting the difficulty in deciding the question of a

deliberate indifference to a specific threat, the Majority found that because
threats between prisoners are common, they could not therefore impute
actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm onto the defendants.4 56 Yet,
its precedent in Farmermakes clear that prison officials may not escape
liability for deliberate indifference by showing that the official did not know
the specific prisoner who was going to commit the act of violence.4 7

453. Id. at 1241 n. 2.
454. See Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1241 (Rosenbaum, R., dissenting).
455. Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1235.
456. Id at 1236.
457.
Farmer,
511Scholarship
U.S. at 843. Digital Archives, 2020
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Although the Majority does recognize that the plaintiff need not have
provided the name or identifying criteria of the specific prisoner who
attacked him, the brief analysis seems to suggest that the court did not give
it the significance it deserved. Marbury made multiple complaints over a
period of months, all of which were ignored. 4 t After he made his last
complaint, where he heard from a friend that he would be attacked, Officer
Warren laughed in his face. 459 Perhaps Marbury did not know the identity of
the person who threatened him. Alternatively, the danger of providing the
identity to the prison official may have been too high.
Marbury provided sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk. He,
instead, failed to provide the name of the specific person putting him at risk.
What this decision suggests, then, is that in order to satisfy the deliberate
indifference standard for a specific threat, it is not enough that there was
sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of serious harm. Instead, this decision
suggests a new trend in requiring prisoners to specifically identify the person
who threatens them, regardless of the new danger that could create.
CONCLUSION

The decision in Marbury has devastating consequences for prisoners
across the state of Alabama and jurisdictions that look to Alabama. Marbury
provided sufficient evidence to support, at least beyond the summary
judgment standard, that he was in a substantial risk of serious harm, and that
both defendants were deliberately indifferent to that harm. As a result of their
deliberate indifference, Marbury was stabbed, in clear violation of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. With this
decision, we are left wondering what is required to satisfy the deliberate
indifference standard when a report by the DOJ and numerous reprimands
from the government for Eighth Amendment violations fail to rise to that
level. Ultimately, this case tells prisoners that despite what the Constitution
says, they will continue to remain second-class citizens whose lives are not
worth the time to ensure safety.

458. Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1231.
459. The dissent importantly notes that this may not be true, but for the purposes of summary
judgment, the court is required to take the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
Id. at 1245.
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol42/iss2/6
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